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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ANTONE R. THOMPSON, : 
Petitioner/Appellant, : 
v. : Case No. 20050894-CA 
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF : 
COMMERCE, DIVISION OF 
OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL : 
LICENSING, 
Respondent/Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This action comes within the original jurisdiction of this Court under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(a) (West 2004) (appeals from agency formal adjudicative proceedings). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUE 1. Did Petitioner waive his right to appellate review regarding his allegation 
that he was not able to obtain transcripts from the 1999 hearing? 
ISSUE 2. Did Petitioner waive his right to appellate review regarding what Petitioner 
calls the "two-day rule"? 
ISSUE 3. Did Petitioner waive his right to appellate review regarding his claim that 
the Department of Occupational and Professional Licensing violated Article I section 10 
of the Constitution? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUES 1-3 RAISED ON APPEAL 
In appealing an agency decision, a petitioner has "the obligation to raise all the issues 
that could have been presented at that time, and those issues not raised [are] waived." 
Ashcroft v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 855 P.2d 267, 268 (Utah App. 1993), cert, denied. 
868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993) (citing Pease v. Industrial Comm'n. 694 P.2d 613 (Utah 1984)). 
There is no standard of review for an issue that has been waived. Appellate courts review 
decisions made and actions taken by lower courts. In order to preserve an issue for review 
"a party must timely bring the issue to the attention of the trial court, thus providing the 
court an opportunity to rule on the issue's merits." LeBaron & Assoc. Inc. v. Rebel 
Enters.. Inc.. 823 P.2d 479, 482-83 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Where a lower adjudicative 
body has not been afforded "an opportunity to rule" on the merits of an issue, an appellate 
court has nothing to review. 
ISSUE 4. Were Petitioner's Due Process rights violated when the Department of 
Commerce conditionally granted his request for Stay Pending Agency Review? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR ISSUE 4 
Under the Utah Administrative Code, "[t]he standards for agency review correspond 
to the standards for judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings " Utah Admin. 
Code Rl 51-46b-12(7) (West 2005). An appellate court "shall grant relief only if. . . the 
agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d) 
(West 2005). An agency's legal disposition of constitutional issues is reviewed for 
correction-of-error. Rg,, State in Interest of K.M.. 965 P.2d 576, 578 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
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("Constitutional issues, including that of due process, are questions of law which we 
review for correctness."). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Admin. Code R151-46b-12(7) (West 2006) 
(7) Standard of Review. The standards for agency review correspond to the standards for 
judicial review of formal adjudicative proceedings, as set forth in Subsection 63-46b-16(4). 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) (West 2005) 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it 
determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any 
of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action is based, is 
unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or 
has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a decision-
making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the 
agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the 
whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the 
inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair and rational basis 
for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS/STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Petitioner Thompson ("Petitioner") was initially licensed on February 21, 1989 to 
practice as a professional engineer in the state of Utah. R. 437. Nearly ten years later, in 
1998, Petitioner prepared a cover letter and an addendum that were attached to a set of 
construction plans submitted to the Cedar City Building Department. R. 437-38. Petitioner 
had not drawn up the plans; they had been designed and created by a general contractor. R. 
438. The letter states that Petitioner "reviewed the plans and approved the structure as 
shown on the plans." R. 437-438. Petitioner not only signed the letter but also affixed his 
professional engineer seal to it. Id The addendum Petitioner attached to the letter includes 
notes setting forth general engineering specifications. R. 438. The specifications set forth 
in the addendum did not conform to the Uniform Building Code ("UBC"). Id Building 
officials reviewed the plans and concluded that they were not accurate or complete. Id. 
The 1999 Order (Addendum A) 
Petitioner was cited and ordered to appear at a September 1999 hearing before the 
Professional Engineers and Professional Land Surveyors Board ("Board") of the Division 
of Occupational and Professional Licensing ("DOPL"). R. 436. The Board found that 
Petitioner had engaged in unprofessional conduct by affixing his professional engineer 
seal to plans that he had not personally prepared. R. 441. The Board further found 
Petitioner's "substantial experience as a professional engineer" as well as his refusal to 
"acknowledge the wrongful nature of his misconduct" to be aggravating circumstances in 
their determination of appropriate disciplinary action. R. 443. The Board submitted 
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Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order ("Order") to the Director 
of DOPL on October 27, 1999. R. 436. The Director adopted the Order on October 29, 
1999. R. 435. 
The Order recommended that Petitioner's license be suspended, but that a stay of 
enforcement be entered and Petitioner's license placed on probation for three years subject 
to certain terms and conditions. R. 444. The conditions required Petitioner to find a peer 
reviewer willing to review his work, provided for random audits of 20% of Petitioner's 
work, scheduled regular meetings between Petitioner and the Board, and required that 
Petitioner complete the Utah Law and Rules Examination for professional engineers. R. 
444-45. 
The Order to Show Cause (Addendum B) 
Over the course of the next three years Petitioner repeatedly failed to meet the 
conditions of the 1999 Order. As a result, on May 29, 2002 DOPL issued a Notice of 
Agency Action and Petition (Order to Show Cause) ("OSC"). R. 426. DOPL requested 
that Petitioner "be adjudged and decreed to have violated the provisions" of the 1999 
Order. Petitioner was sent notice on June 3, 2002 that he had twenty days to file a written 
response to the OSC and that a hearing on the matter would be held July 29, 2002. R. 423-
24. Petitioner failed to respond to the OSC within twenty days of being sent notice. R. 421. 
On July 12, 2002, well beyond the twenty-day limit, DOPL made a Motion for Default. R. 
419. 
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During this time, Petitioner obtained counsel and was eventually granted leave by the 
Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") to file a response by August 12, 2002. R. 415. A 
prehearing teleconference for the purpose of determining whether the matter could be 
resolved by stipulation was scheduled for September 3, 2002. R. 416. That prehearing 
conference never took place, as DOPL and Petitioner agreed to settle the matter by 
stipulation. R. 410. The parties were given until October 15, 2002 to execute a written 
stipulation. R. 407. 
The parties did not reach an agreement by October 15, 2002. R. 403. Finally, on 
September 2, 2004 the ALJ held a prehearing conference wherein counsel for DOPL and 
Petitioner informed the ALJ that they were still pursuing settlement negotiations. R. 404. l 
The ALJ granted ongoing leave to the parties to continue settlement negotiations, but also 
ordered Petitioner to file a written response to the OSC no later than September 17, 2004, 
ordered DOPL to provide its witness and exhibit list to Petitioner by September 30, 2004, 
and scheduled a prehearing teleconference for October 13, 2004 to assess progress toward 
resolving the matter by stipulation. R. 404-05. DOPL provided its witness and exhibit list 
to Petitioner on time. R. 359. Petitioner again failed to file a written response as mandated 
by the ALJ. R. 397-398. 
DOPL filed a Motion for Default and Entry of Final Order and Memorandum on 
September 23, 2004. R.363. Petitioner provided a response to the OSC on September 29, 
1
 The record does not disclose the reason for this gap in time. 
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2004, nunc (IMP I fu,ii \earis ,iftn I In -1 )S<' w;is issunl consist injL* ul'a numerical list 
< islensiblv correspondent to the OSC with either "Admit" or "Deny" next to most items R 
342-44. On October 13, 2004 the ALJ conducted a prehearing teleconference with counsel 
representing DOPL and counsel representing Petitioner R \ w» I lie Al J uckno \ It'dged 
that Petitioner had again l.ulnl U innidh lilt but i l n i i n i P O l i > Mulion loi Di'liiull, -
i niiiK I(i(iiiii« ih.'ii ilic I'Jist" ou^hl to be resolved on its merits. R. 337. Counsel for Petitioner 
stated that he expected that Petitioner would execute a proposed stipulation so as to avoid 
another hearing before the Board. Id The ALJ ordered that the stipulation be submitu t no 
later than Octob. 
2004 :.. sin Jiut uecn iesolved by stipulation. Id, Counsel for Petitioner 
notified DOPL and the ALJ that he had withdrawn from the case on October 15 2004. R. 
355. 
Counsel tot I K IPI ami IVlilionu p.ulicipali d in i pirlicMiiin? t nntiTnHT hrhl mi 
,
 (l( ,0 | ,u . 20^  20().I R, 13K. The ALJ noted that the next meeting of the Board would be 
conducted on November 10, 2004 Id. Petitioner informed the participants that he had 
potentially identified substitute counsel that would assist him during the Board meeting. 
j.d I In; Al J niclnnul ih.il (In hciiriiijL' ^mj l i l hi hrM ,n () i i i imril mci'linu of NnM'nibrr l'11 
2004 unless Petitioner's counsel was unavailable that day, in which case the hearing would 
be held during the January 2005 Board meeting. R. 339. 
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The Stipulation and Order (Addendum C) 
Petitioner's new counsel filed a Notice of Appearance of Counsel on November 3, 
2004. R. 335. At a prehearing teleconference held on November 4, 2004 counsel for 
petitioner informed counsel for DOPL and the ALJ that he believed the case could be 
resolved by stipulation. R. 330. Counsel for Petitioner also informed the ALJ and counsel 
for DOPL that he would not be available to attend the Board meeting of November 10, 
2004. R. 330-31. The ALJ accommodated Petitioner by rescheduling the hearing to 
coincide with the January 12, 2005 Board meeting. R. 331. The ALJ also granted leave to 
DOPL and Petitioner to pursue and attempt to finalize a stipulation until December 3, 
2004. Id The ALJ ordered that if no stipulation had been reached by that date, Petitioner 
would be required to provide witness and exhibit lists to DOPL no later than December 
10, 2004. R. 332. DOPL had already provided witness and exhibit lists to Petitioner 
months prior. R. 359. 
Petitioner filed a Motion to Extend Deadline for Respondent to Designate Witnesses 
and Hearing Exhibits on December 10, 2004. R. 327. Petitioner eventually filed a list of 
three witnesses on December 20, 2004. R. 326. On January 10, 2005 counsel for Petitioner 
filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, stating that Petitioner had "failed to participate 
meaningfully in preparation for the hearing, ha[d] not produced any documentary evidence 
for the hearing and untimely designated witnesses for the hearing." R. 323. 
Prior to the hearing of January 12, 2005, DOPL entered into a stipulation with 
Petitioner to resolve the matter. R. 314. The Stipulation and Order ("Stipulation") entered 
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into on January 1J '! (XI ? represented "flic lull . 11 in I I i 11 • 11 n s o 111111 in i ( >. 111 .111 c pi i f i 11 s . 111 \ ( 
* -1 Stipulation outl ined the condi t ions of the 1999 
Order and expressed that Peti t ioner had failed to comply with that Order . R } ] ( U n d e r 
the Stipulation, the parties agreed that Pet i t ioner ' s l icense would be suspended for a 
m i n i m u m of four months from the effective date ol the Mipulnlii m lluil il.ile hcin^ lliirty 
< I j . - ••• • • ^fDOPI R 315 Various other • 
i : ais similar to those of the original 1999 Order are outlined in the Stipulation, most 
of which include review of Petitioner's work so as to ensure that "his work demonstrates 
an ability to safely practice as a professional engineer. January 12, JOOS J )an 
S J 3! i€ s, Bi ii eai i C \ i I •>•*•. - '• Genera l ' s Office 
and Petitioner signed the Stipulation. R. 320. 
Six days later, on January 18, 2005 Petitioner filed a "Rescission of Stipulation" for 
"Breech [sic] of Stipulation on the Part of 11)( H'l 1 and'Oi I ic- c inJ lln: hclurc n i nlioned 
i Petitioner refers 
concerns the premature post ing of his l icense as suspended on D O P L ' s website, a mistake 
which was corrected immediately upon detection, R ^RP In all, Pet i t ioner 's license was 
mistakenly listed as suspended on I M 'lf "1, s website ,-. 
llic wrhsitc iiccuriilcl' u llcclcJ III ml lm\ license \\fis Mun ^probationary s ta tus" instead of 
suspended I d , 
Peti t ioner 's other grounds for rescinding the Stipulation, those Petitioner seemingly 
argues make the Stipulation rescindable "for cause, ' include: A claim that the original 
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citation was motivated not by the fact that he affixed his professional engineer seal to 
plans that he had not prepared, plans which he had reviewed and expressly approved 
despite the fact that they were inaccurate, incomplete and not up to code, but instead that 
the citation was issued as a personal (and serendipitous) vendetta; a claim that the Board's 
holding that he had not aided in the unlicensed practice of architecture precluded it from 
holding that he had engaged in unprofessional conduct in affixing his seal to plans he had 
not prepared; a claim that DOPL obstructed Petitioner's ability to obtain an attorney to 
represent him in a hearing held on September 21, 1999 for a citation issued on May 15, 
1998; a claim that Board members and DOPL spoke privately about his case; a claim that 
Petitioner was not allowed to use the witnesses and exhibits in the initial hearing of 
September 21, 1999; and a claim that the Order, the terms of which Petitioner violated, 
was vague and arbitrary and that Petitioner had complied with those requirements of the 
Order "which was [sic] in my control." R. 311-12. 
Petitioner and counsel for DOPL participated in a teleconference on February 4, 2005 
at which it was decided that oral argument on the matter would be heard on February 11, 
2005. R. 304. After receiving evidence and hearing oral argument the ALJ issued its 
decision on February 16, 2005. R. 292. The ALJ recommended that Petitioner's request to 
rescind be denied. Id, The Director of DOPL adopted the recommendation the same day. 
R. 283. The next day Petitioner filed a "Directive to Compel a Stay of Stipulation Pending 
Appeal" in which he requested a stay of the Stipulation and indicated his desire to appeal 
the denial of his request to rescind. R. 281. The Utah Department of Commerce 
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("Commerce") promptly responded (In lollm\ 111,1- d;i\ in i Irllri llnil informed IVlilimuT 
tl 12 it 1 lis i eqi lests 1( v c: i e pi ei i lati n e • ai id explained the process he would need to follow in 
order to request a stay of the Stipulation and agency review of the decision to deny his 
motion to rescind. R. 279-80. 
On Marcl I 18 2005 Petitioner filed a Request for Agenc) R e\ iew cl lallei lgii :tg 
the same day, 
Petitioner made a Motion for Stay of Stipulation Pending Agency Review. R. 275. 
(Included here as Addendum D). On March 25, 2005 Petitioner again obtained counsel. 
R.265. DOPL and counsel f or I ^ titioner held a scheduling teleconference oi 11"\ \i i cl I 29,, 
was established. R. 261. 
On April 6, 2005 the Utah Department of Commerce ("Commerce") issued an Order 
Regarding Stay Request that conditionally granted i'ei ii luiier \ KIOIJOM Im Sia\ K il 'ill 
those issued during the previous six years in the Order and in the Stipulation. R. 154-55. 
Petitioner responded by filing a "Second Request for Hearing" on his Request for Stay 
Pending Agency Review on April I !, JIHi'i \i I \t\ < 'itJti!iKT«v <k'niul Ihi^  rnj'j'i \< en 
\\w\\ I 1 "(HO | IN mi i ii mi in i niiiii ih ii h IIIKIIII i IIJHI ' identified no provision for a hearing on a 
request for a stay in the applicable rules" and that Commerce itself was "not aware of any 
such procedure." R 75. Petitioner responded on April 19, 2005 by making a "Third 
Request for Hearing" on his Request for Stay Pending Agency Review. is request 
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was denied by Commerce on May 5, 2005. R. 47. Petitioner's counsel filed a Notice of 
Withdrawal of Counsel on May 12, 2005. R. 41. 
Agency Review 
During the course of this litigation Petitioner filed three affidavits. (R. at 68 , 85, 271). 
On April 22, 2006 DOPL made a Motion to Strike all three affidavits. R. 62. On August 4, 
2005 Commerce issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Order Granting Motion to 
Strike, and Order on Review("Order on Review"). R. 18 (included here as Addendum F). 
The Order on Review granted DOPL's motion to strike, holding that "all new factual 
information that Petitioner provides in his many affidavits and his memoranda on agency 
review, which was not initially raised before [DOPL], is an improper attempt to 
supplement [DOPL's] record." R. 26. The Order on Review further pointed out that "legal 
issues must be raised at the Division level in order to be properly preserved for agency 
review," and held that Petitioner's arguments "regarding the two-day rule, not being 
represented by counsel, being under the influence of medications, that [DOPL] coerced 
him into signing the Stipulation, etc." had not been properly preserved for review 
"[b]ecause Petitioner failed to bring these issues to [DOPL] at the time of the rescission 
hearing " R. 27. The Order on Review held that "[b]y his own failure to raise these 
arguments, Petitioner waived them," and that "[a]s a result, such arguments cannot now be 
considered on agency review." Id. (citing Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co.. 966 P.2d 844, 
847 (Utah 1998)). 
12 
The Order on Review then addressed the only issue properly before 
I om inme "n l i t l l i iT f i x )IM ||>n>|>erh denied IVl i l ioi iu inoli HI In set aside 11ln 
Stipulation...." R. 28. The Order on Review treated Petitioner's "Rescission of 
Stipulation" as "a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure." Id. The Order on Review held that "[j)QPL's]
 a nd Al , onclusions 
were reasonable in lln.s ease, and llliiii1, I M HI „iinl lllin ,\| il had nnl abused then diserrlion 
cuiai, the Order on Review held that the ALJ was reasonable in concluding 
that prematurely posting the status of Petitioner's license as "suspended" instead of "on 
probation" did not constitute "fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct" under 
60(b)(3). bi it w as ii istead "a elc i ical en 01 01: 0. . • 
The Order on Review held that Petitioner was not entitled to relief under 60(b), and 
ordered that "[t]he parties shall hereafter conduct themselves in accordance with the terms 
and conditions of the [January 12, 2005] Stipulation and Order.' R. 33. ()n August 1I\ 
'(HIS ih,u:ii(\-oin I ' I I day. all* i \ nti > ol tin < iidei uii He\ nK\\ IVf i fmiin tiled .i U '^ipK- .1 
tor Reconsideration for Agency Review. R. 14. On that same day, Petitioner filed a 
petition for an extension of time to file that request. R 16 Commerce denied the extension 
and Petitioner's Request for Reconsideration on September 12, 2005 because it was not 
l i i i ich liJc'il, R K Pi litmner filed ii Nol iu >l Appeal nn Sepk II I IHT f'i. ?0().S, U II ' '. 
On appeal, Petitioner raises the following as issues: First, whether the ALJ erred in 
denying Petitioner's Due Process rights "in withholding and telling [Petitioner] that they 
cannot find the transcripts for the [1999] hearing" held before the Board; second, whether 
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the ALJ erred "in denying [Petitioner] his right to the DOPL's administrative Two-Day 
Rule "; third, whether the ALJ erred when it "impaired the obligation of a stipulation 
or contract" in violation of U.S. Const, art. I, § 10; and fourth, whether the ALJ denied 
Petitioner Due Process of Law in denying Petitioner a "Stay of Action of the Stipulation of 
January 12, 2005 while the appeal is in process." Petr.'s Br. 2-5. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Petitioner has waived his right to litigate the first three purported issues outlined in his 
brief. Petitioner claims first that he was not able to obtain transcripts from the 1999 
hearing, second that DOPL violated the "two-day rule," and third that DOPL violated the 
Constitution. Petr.'s Br. 2-5. Petitioner failed to mention any of these issues before the 
ALJ despite multiple chances to do so, and thus did not give the DOPL the chance to 
respond and the ALJ the opportunity to rule on these issues. As a result, he has waived his 
right to litigate these issues before the Department of Commerce and before this Court. 
The Department of Commerce did not violate Petitioner's right to due process of law 
when it conditionally granted his request for a stay pending agency review. Commerce did 
not deny Petitioner's Request for Stay Pending Agency Review, as Petitioner claims in his 
brief. Petr.'s Br. 4. Commerce conditionally granted Petitioner's request, and by so doing 
did not violate Petitioner's rights to due process of law. Petitioner has no due process right 
to a full, unconditional stay of the DOPL order pending intra-agency review by the 
Department of Commerce. In any event, any issue arising from the motion for stay of 
14 
I M HIVs order pending agency rev iew by Coi i n nerce is n loot bee: ause Coi i u: i :ie:::i:: ce has i :i iade 
its decisioi 1, ai id a fn idii lg ii 1 Petitioi lei 's fa\ 01 w ould now have no effect. 
ARGUMENT 
I THE FIRST ISSUE RAISED BY PETITIONER HAS NOT BEEN 
PRESERVED FOR APPELLATE REVIEW 
IVh l imie i h.is n . i n n l Ins i t i ' l i ! il< Iitlirah: line Mr.I [ i i t i pn i tn l r,sne outl ined ill In1 Inn I 
and this Coi irt should refuse to consider it. 
Petitioner first claimed that DOPL withheld transcripts of the 1999 hearing in his 
request of Judicial/Agency Review, dated March 1 * 2005 (R. . K two months after 
signing Ihe Nhpul.ihi m m l«tm i« n \ I.', '"<)'0'» l\" > ••' nu menliur il llnr-,, 
claiiii at tlle January 12, 2005 meeting. He made no mention of this claim in his motion for 
"Rescission of Stipulation" that he filed on January 18, 2005, (R. 111), nor did he bring up 
this claim at the hearing regarding the motioi i^ rescission held on February I L 2005 I le 
i i iade i 10 n lei ltioi i • ::: 1 t l l i s c la i i :i: ::i ii :i 1 l is S e p t e • - *• •« 
Show Cause. R. 342. 
The matter was never brought to the ALJ's or DOPL's attention, and thus was not 
properly preserved for intra-agency review by Commerce 1his court has held it 
\ t \ io t i i * i fn in oiii ftlh nsai ' \ v\ " Inn llial ,i \uw\\ niii^ll I'.us* ,in oh|ret ion iiiii i n f .iilliii r 
proceeding or waive its right to litigate the issue in subsequent proceedings" and 
emphasized that "[t]his principle is ilot limited to the trial court setting, but applies equally 
to administrative hearings." Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman. 790 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah Ct. 
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App. 1990). Though he had ample opportunity to raise this claim with DOPL, Petitioner 
failed to do so. As a result, Commerce properly refused to consider the claim. Petitioner 
has waived his right to litigate this claim before this Court. See Badger v. Brooklyn CanaL 
922 P.2d 745, 751 (Utah 1998) (u[T]he failure to make known the nature of one's rights in 
the course of an administrative proceeding clearly disentitles a party from raising its claim 
for the first time before a district court on de novo review."). 
II. THE SECOND ISSUE RAISED BY PETITIONER HAS NOT BEEN 
PRESERVED FOR APPELLATE REVIEW 
Petitioner has waived his right to litigate the second purported issue outlined in his 
brief, and this Court should refuse to consider it. 
Petitioner first claimed that DOPL had violated what he refers to as the "two-day rule" 
in a Supplemental Memorandum in support of his Request for Agency Review, dated 
April 13, 2005. R. 77.2 Petitioner made no mention of this claim at the meeting on January 
12, 2005. He made no mention of this claim in the "Rescission of Stipulation" that he filed 
on January 18, 2005, (R. 311), nor did he bring up this claim at the hearing regarding that 
motion held on February 11, 2005. 
The matter was never brought to the ALJ's or DOPL's attention, and thus was not 
properly preserved for intra-agency review by Commerce. As mentioned previously, this 
Court has held that a party in an administrative hearing "must raise an objection in an 
2
 The "rule"mentioned by Petitioner refers not to a rule, but instead to a line in the 
June 3, 2002 Notice of Agency Action and Order to Show Cause Hearing. R. 109. This 
"rule" appears nowhere else. 
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c \ LI lie i proceeding c i w ai\ e its i ightto litigate the issue in subsequent proceedings." 
Brinkerhoff790 P.2d at 589. See also Brooklyn Canal. 922 P.2d at 751 ("[T]he failure to 
make known the nature of one's rights in the course of an administrative proceeding 
clearly disentitles a party from raising its claim 
de i 10 < o i ei - iew ") I 'etitioi ler I lad i i n lltiple oppoi I:i u lities to raise tl lis ..claim before DOPL, 
but did not. As a result, Commerce properly refused to consider the claim. Petitioner has 
waived his right to litigate this claim before this court, and this court should refuse to 
consider it. 
III. 1HE 1 H1KD ISSUE RAISED BY PETITIONER II IS NOT BEEN 
PRESERVED FOR APPELLATE REVIEW 
Petitioner has waived his right to litigate the third purported issue outlined in his brief, 
and this Court should refuse to consider it. 
I * - "\ violated Article * c 
Constitution in his Request for Agency Review, dated March i6, 2UU5. R. 268. Petitioner 
made no mention of this claim at the meeting on January 12. 2005. He made no mention of 
this claim in the "Rescissioi i of Stipulation" that 1 le I lied ::»! I January > 
mi ilnl In biiiij' iifi llir. i Ilium ,il llir liniiiiiL' rc^arilnii" 111 ill mulimi lurid mi I liituun 11, 
2005 (Hearing Transcript). 
The matter was never brought to the ALJ's or DOPL's attention, and thus was not 
properly preserved for intra-agency review by Commerce I his court has held that a party 
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right to litigate the issue in subsequent proceedings." Brinkerhoff. 790 P.2d at 589. See 
also Brooklyn Canal. 922 P.2d at 751. Petitioner had multiple opportunities to raise this 
claim before DOPL, but did not. As a result, Commerce properly refused to consider the 
claim. Petitioner has waived his right to litigate this claim before this Court. 
IV. THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE DID NOT VIOLATE 
PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN IT 
CONDITIONALLY GRANTED HIS REQUEST FOR STAY PENDING 
AGENCY REVIEW 
Petitioner's statement of the issue is ill-formed. Petitioner's Request for Stay Pending 
Agency Review was not denied, as claimed in his brief. Petr.'s Br. 4. Petitioner's request 
was conditionally granted. R. 151. (See Addendum E). Petitioner's rights to due process of 
law were not violated when his request for Stay Pending Agency Review was 
conditionally granted and he rejected the ruling and refused to abide by the terms of the 
stay. 
A party requesting agency review "may request that the effective date of the order 
subject to review be stayed pending the completion of review." Utah Admin. Code R151-
46b-12(4)(a). Petitioner filed a Motion for Stay of Stipulation Pending Judicial/Agency 
Review on March 18, 2005. R. 275. "The division or committee that issued the order 
subject to review may oppose the request for a stay in writing within ten days from the 
date the stay is requested." Utah Admin. Code R151-46b-12(4)(b). DOPL timely filed an 
Objection to Stay on March 28, 2005. R. 264. 
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In deciding whether or not to grant a stay, the agency "shall review the division's or 
committee's findings of fact, conclusions of law and order to determine whether granting a 
stay would, or might reasonably be expected to, pose a significant threat to the public 
health, safety and welfare." Utah Admin. Code R151-46b-12(4)(c). "The department may 
also issue a conditional stay by imposing terms, conditions or restrictions on a party 
pending agency review." Id. 
Commerce responded to Petitioner's request for Stay Pending Agency Review and 
DOPL's Objection to Stay by issuing an Order Regarding Stay Request on April 6, 2005. 
R. 151. In reviewing DOPL's "findings of fact, conclusions of law and order" in accord 
with Administrative Rule 151, Commerce concluded that an unconditional stay "would not 
be in the best interests of the public." R. 154. However, using its power to issue a 
conditional stay under Rule 151, Commerce held that "the public could be adequately 
protected with a conditional stay of [DOPL's] Order with appropriate measures to monitor 
his practice." Id. Commerce granted a stay contingent upon Petitioner's compliance with 
seven requirements similar in purpose and scope to those found in the original 1999 Order. 
R.154-55. 
Having found that an unconditional stay "would not be in the best interests of the 
public," Commerce was within its right to deny the stay altogether, but chose instead to 
exercise its discretion and provide a way to grant the stay and also protect the public. See 
Utah Admin. Code R151-46b-12(4)(c) ("The department may also issue a conditional stay 
by imposing terms, conditions or restrictions on a party pending agency review.") 
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(emphasis added). Petitioner refused to accept the condition of the stay, instead responding 
with a "Second Request for Hearing" (R. 146), followed by a "Third Request for Hearing" 
on the matter. R. 71. 
Under Utah's Administrative Procedures Act, when reviewing final agency action 
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, an appellate court "shall grant relief only 
if, on the basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review 
has been substantially prejudiced" by the agency action, by an erroneous interpretation of 
law on part of the agency, etc. or if the agency action is an abuse of discretion, contrary to 
a rule of the agency, or otherwise arbitrary and capricious. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) 
(West 2005) (certain provisions omitted). Commerce did not erroneously interpret the law. 
Commerce closely followed Rule 151 of the Utah Administrative Code, and even 
exercised its discretion in finding a way to conditionally grant Petitioner's request. 
Petitioner was not substantially prejudiced when Commerce conditionally granted this 
request, and that action was far from arbitrary and capricious. Petitioner has cited no 
authority, and Respondent has found none, to support the proposition that litigants have a 
due process right to a full, unconditional stay of final judgments. Utah rules use 
discretionary language in instructing adjudicative bodies regarding stays pending review. 
See Utah R. App. P. 8 {"Application for a stay . . .; to determine whether granting a stay 
would...; motion will show the reasons for the relief requested... "); Utah Admin. Code 
Rl 51-46b-12(4) ("... the party seeking review may request that the effective date of the 
order...) (emphases added). The language used injudicial opinions similarly relies on the 
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assumption that stays pending review are granted or denied at their discretion. See, eg.. 
Lane v. Messer, 689 P.2d 1333, 1334 n.l (Utah 1984) ("Whether the relationship between 
the parties and issues involved in the appeal and those remaining before the trial court 
might warrant a stay of the trial court proceedings pending the appeal is a matter for the 
sound discretion of the trial court, a matter upon which we express no view."); Jensen v. 
Schwendiman, 744 P.2d 1026 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (denying litigant stay request because 
appellant did not convincingly show that he was likely to succeed on the merits on appeal). 
Furthermore, a due process right to a stay pending agency review would make "final" 
judgments contingent upon completion of the appellate review process, rendering them 
less than final. 
In any event, any issue arising from the motion for stay of DOPL's order pending 
agency review is moot. Agency review has come and gone, and Petitioner has made no 
request for a stay of Commerce's decision. A finding in favor of Petitioner on this issue 
can provide him no relief. The Utah Supreme Court has held that "[a]n issue on appeal is 
considered moot when the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants." 
State v. Vicente, 2004 UT 6, ^ 3, 84 P.3d 1191 (internal citations omitted). The judicial 
relief requested by Petitioner cannot affect his rights, and this Court should not address 
this moot issue. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Respondent asks the Court to affirm the agency's order 
denying Petitioner's request to set aside his Stipulation. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
Respondent does not request oral argument and a published opinion in this matter. 
The questions raised in this appeal are not such that oral argument or a published opinion 
is necessary, though respondent desires to participate in oral argument if such is held by 
the Court. 
Respectfully submitted this llM^ day of June, 2006. 
A JL.ALJ 
ANNINA MITCHELL 
Utah Solicitor General 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Respondent, postage prepaid, to the Petitioner this ll^rU. day of June, 2006: 
ANTONE RODNEY THOMPSON 
350 S. 500 W. 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSE OF : FINDINGS OF FACT 
ANTONE R. THOMPSON : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
TO PRACTICE AS A PROFESSIONAL ENGINEER : AND RECOMMENDED ORDER 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH | : Case No. DOPL-98-105 
i 
Appearances: f 
Jeffrey C. Hunt for the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing 
Antone R. Thompson for Respondent 
BY THE BOARD: 
A September 21, 1999 hearing was conducted in the above-
entitled proceeding before J. Steven Eklund, Administrative Law 
Judge for the Department of Commerce, and the Professional 
Engineers and Professional Land Surveyors Board. Members of the 
Board present were Charles Henry Richardson, Barry C. Anderson, 
Robert Knox, Hardin A. Whitney, Scott F. McNeil and Stanley S. 
Postma. 
The remaining Board member (Kenneth Lawrence DeVries) was 
not present when the hearing began. Accordingly, Mr. Devries did 
not participate as a Board member in this proceeding. A. Gary 
Bowen, Director of the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing, joined the hearing in progress. 
Thereafter, evidence was offered and received. The Board, 
being fully advised on the premises, now enters its Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and submits the following Recommended 
Order for review and action by the Division: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Respondent is, and at all time relevant to this 
proceeding has been, licensed to practice as a professional 
engineer in this state. Respondent was initially licensed on 
February 21, 1989. 
2. John Pace, a Cedar City businessman, submitted a set of 
commercial construction plans to the Cedar City Building 
Department on January 25, 1998 to obtain a building permit. The 
plans were construction drawings for a new warehouse and showroom 
designed as an addition to an existing structure. 
3. Glenn Scott Jensen, a licensed general contractor, had 
prepared the just-described plans at the request of Mr., Pace. 
Mr. Jensen is not licensed as an engineer or architect. The 
construction drawings which Mr. Jensen prepared do not contain 
the seal of any licensed professional engineer or architect. 
4. The construction plans which Mr. Pace submitted to the 
Cedar City Building Department included a January 14, 1998 cover 
letter, prepared by Respondent, which recites that Mr. Jensen had 
contacted Respondent to provide engineering services relative to 
the construction plans. The letter recites Respondent "reviewed 
the plans and approved the structure as shown on the plans". 
5. Respondent signed the January 14, 1998 letter and he 
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also affixed his professional engineer seal to that letter. 
Respondent attached a six (6) page addendum to the letter. The 
attachment consists of generic notes which set forth general 
engineering specifications relative to concrete, steel, masonry 
and wood materials. 
6. The various specifications set forth in the attachment 
to the January 14, 1998 letter indicate those specifications 
would conform to the 1994 edition of the Uniform Building Codes. 
However, the 1997 Code edition governed all construction in Utah 
when the plans in question were submitted to the Cedar City 
Building Department. The specifications set forth in the general 
notes attached to those plans are not consistent with those 1997 
Code requirements. 
7. Based on the substantial and credible evidence 
presented, Mr. Jensen designed and prepared the construction 
plans in question without Respondent's supervision or oversight. 
An engineer's review and seal of those plans was required to 
obtain a Cedar City building permit. Based on the substantial 
and credible evidence presented, and the reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom, the January 14, 1998 letter constitutes 
Respondent's approval of the plans as drawn by Mr. Jensen. 
8. Cedar City building officials reviewed the plans and 
determined they were not accurate and complete. Accordingly, no 
building permit was issued based on those plans. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
U.C.A. §58-1-401(2) provides the Division may revoke, 
suspend, restrict, place on probation, issue a public or private 
reprimand to, or otherwise act upon the license of any licensee 
who: 
(a) . . .has engaged in unprofessional 
conduct, as defined by statute or rule under 
this title; | 
(b) . . . has engaged in unlawful conduct 
as defined by statute under this title. 
Section 58-1-501 (1) (a) generally defines unprofessional 
conduct to include: 
. . . practicing or engaging in, 
representing oneself to be practicing or 
engaging in, or attempting to practice or 
engage in any occupation or profession 
requiring licensure under this title if the 
person is: 
(i) not licensed to do so or not exempted 
from licensure under this title . . . . 
The Division asserts Respondent engaged in unlawful conduct 
because he aided and abetted the unlicenced practice of 
architecture when: (1) he approved the construction plans and 
affixed his seal on a letter of verification pertaining to the 
structural engineering of those plans; (2) he provided 
specifications to the plans which were not drawn by a licensed 
architect or professional engineer; and (3) he affixed his seal 
to plans which were not prepared under his supervision. 
However, the Board finds and concludes Respondent would not 
have been engaged in the unauthorized practice of architecture 
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had he directly prepared the plans in question. Such work would 
have been incidental to the proper scope of Respondent's practice 
as a professional engineer. 
Thus, no proper legal basis exists to find and conclude 
Respondent aided and/or abetted the unlicenced practice of 
architecture merely because he approved the construction plans, 
affixed his seal to a letter of verification pertinent to those 
plans, provided specifications to the plans which were not 
prepared by a licensed architect or professional engineer and 
affixed his seal to the plans which were not prepared under his 
supervision. Accordingly, the Board finds and concludes 
Respondent has not violated §58-1-501 (1) (a) and no proper basis 
exists to conclude he was engaged in any unlawful conduct 
relative to the foregoing matters. 
The Division next asserts Respondent engaged in 
unprofessional conduct because he aided and abetted the 
unlicenced practice of architecture when he knowingly approved 
and affixed his seal to construction plans which had been 
prepared by an unlicenced person not under his supervision. 
Consistent with the above-stated analysis, the Board similarly 
concludes no legal basis exists to find that Respondent was 
engaged in such unprofessional conduct violative of §58-1-
501(2) (a) . 
However, §58-1-501(2) defines unprofessional conduct to 
include: 
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(g) practicing . . . an occupation or 
profession regulated under this title through 
gross incompetence, gross negligence or a 
pattern of incompetency or negligence. 
§58-22-603 sets forth the manner in which a professional engineer 
or professional structural engineer is authorized to use a seal, 
to wit: 
(1) A professional engineer or 
professional structural engineer may only 
affix the licenseefs seal to a plan, 
specification, and report when the plan, 
specification and report: 
(a) was personally prepared by the 
licensee; 
(b) was prepared by an employee, 
subordinate, associate, or drafter under the 
supervision of a licensee, provided the 
licensee or principal affixing his seal 
assumes responsibility. 
Moreover, §58-22-102(16) further provides: 
"Supervision of an employee, subordinate, 
associate, or drafter of a licensee" means 
that a licensed professional engineer, 
professional structural engineer, or 
professional land surveyor is responsible for 
and personally reviews, corrects when 
necessary, and approves work performed by any 
employee, subordinate, associate, or drafter 
under the direction of the licensee, and may 
be further defined by rule by the division in 
collaboration with the board. 
R156-22-102 thus provides: 
(11) "Unlicensed employees, subordinates, 
associates, or drafters of a person licensed 
under this chapter" means persons not 
licensed as a professional engineer who 
perform professional engineering . . . 
services under the direct supervision of a 
licensed professional engineer . . . and who 
do not offer professional engineering or 
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professional land surveying services directly 
to the public. 
The structural engineering services which Respondent 
provided and the specifications which he submitted with the 
January 14, 1998 letter are critically deficient in numerous 
respects. The drawings are inaccurate and totally inadequate as 
to permit any structure to be properly built according to those 
specifications. Thus, Respondent engaged in grossly negligent 
conduct violative of §58-1-501 (2) (g) . Such conduct constitutes 
an extreme departure from the standards of practice governing all 
professional engineers. 
Further, Respondent violated §58-22-603(a) when he affixed 
his seal to the construction drawings in question when he had not 
prepared those drawings and the drawings had not been otherwise 
prepared under his supervision. Accordingly, a further factual 
and legal basis exists to enter a disciplinary sanction as to 
Respondent's license. 
The Board duly notes Respondent's urgence that he assumed 
Cedar City building officials would contact him after they had 
reviewed the plans and specifications to thus identify any 
deficiencies which they noted as to prompt subsequent changes or 
additions to those plans and/or specifications. Nevertheless, 
Respondent's January 14, 1998 letter unambiguously recites that 
he reviewed the plans and he approved the structure as shown on 
those plans. 
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Given the numerous deficiencies in the plans and 
specifications, the Board readily finds and concludes Respondent 
either did not understand or he cavalierly ignored the fact that 
he has no authority to approve plans. Moreover, Respondent failed 
to either prepare plans and specifications which were sufficient 
as to possibly prompt the subsequent issuance of a building 
permit or he failed to supervise the preparation of such plans 
and specifications. 
Respondent cursorily reviewed the plans prepared by Mr. 
Jensen and affixed his seal to the plans without any meaningful 
review of those plans. Further, Respondent merely attached 
generic specifications to the plans. Given his wholly inadequate 
review of the plans and his entirely unwarranted reference to 
boiler plate specifications that did not comply with governing 
Code requirements, Respondent knew or should have know that he 
could not affix his seal to those plans. 
There are two aggravating circumstances which must be 
considered regarding the disciplinary sanction which should be 
entered in this proceeding. Respondent is either unable or 
refuses to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his misconduct. 
Moreover, Respondent has substantial experience as a professional 
engineer. Accordingly, he should have been well aware of the 
nature of review or supervision necessary as to warrant any 
submission of the plans and specifications. Respondent's sealing 
of the plans was completely unjustified. 
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The Board thus concludes the Recommended Order set forth 
below is necessary to address Respondent's egregious failure to 
comply with the well-recognized standards which govern all 
professional engineers in this state. The Board concludes 
Respondent's continuing practice as a professional engineer must 
be adequately monitored to protect the public. The Board 
cautions Respondent that ongoing compliance with the requirements 
of the Recommended Order set forth below is essential to maintain 
his opportunity to continue practicing as a professional engineer 
in this state. 
RECOMMENDED ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED Respondent's license to practice as 
a professional engineer in this state shall be suspended. 
However, a stay of enforcement shall enter as to that suspension 
and Respondent's license shall be placed on probation for three 
(3) years, subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) Within two months after this 
Recommended Order becomes effective, 
Respondent shall submit a written proposal to 
the Board which identifies a peer reviewer 
who is available and willing to generally 
review any structural or civil engineering 
services which Respondent may subsequently 
provide. 
(2) The just-stated written proposal shall 
also provide for random audits of 20% of the 
work performed by Respondent during the 
previous six (6) months. Respondent shall 
bear the cost of such audits. The plan shall 
further provide for similar ongoing audits to 
be conducted every six (6) months. Audit 
reports shall be provided to the Board every 
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six months to reflect the work which has been 
reviewed and whether that work has been 
performed consistent with the standards which 
govern professional engineers in this state. 
(3) Respondent shall meet with the Board 
during the next regularly scheduled Board 
meeting conducted after this Recommended 
Order becomes effective. Respondent shall 
thereafter meet with the Board every six (6) 
months. The Board may modify the frequency of 
those meetings as subsequently warranted. 
(4) Within three months from the date this 
Recommended Order becomes effective, 
Respondent shall successfully complete the 
Utah Law and Rules Examination for 
professional engineers. Documentation shall 
be provided to the Division to thus establish 
that Respondent has timely satisfied the 
just-stated requirement. 
Should Respondent fail to comply with the above-stated terms 
and conditions or otherwise violate any statute or rule which 
governs the practice of professional engineers in this state, 
further proceedings shall be conducted and a determination made 
whether the stay of enforcement set forth herein should be 
vacated and the suspension of Respondent's license become 
effective. 
On behalf of the Professional Engineers and Professional 
Land Surveyors Licensing Board, I hereby certify the foregoing 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order were 
submitted to A. Gary Bowen, Director of the Division o£. 
Occupational and Professional Licensing, on the ^ / ^ - ^ day 
of October, 1999 for his review and action. 
- £ 
Jl feteven EVLund 




I hereby certify that on the ' day of June, 2002, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITION AND NOTICE OF 
AGENCY ACTION AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE HEARING was sent first 
class mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Antone R. Thompson 
350 South 500 West 




DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
160 East 300 South - Box 146741 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841114-6741 
Telephone: (801) 530-6628 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSE OF 
ANTONE R. THOMPSON 
TO PRACTICE AS A 
PROFESSONAL ENGINEER 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
P E T I T I O N 
(Order to Show Cause) 
CASE NO. DOPL-2002-123 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
These claims were investigated by the Utah Division of Occupational 
and Professional Licensing ("Division") upon complaints that Antone R. 
Thompson, P.E. ("Respondent"), a licensee of the Division, has engaged in acts 
and practices which constitute violations of the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-1-101 to 58-1-504 (1998) and 
the Division's Order in Case No. 98-105. 
PARTIES 
1. The Division is a division of the Department of Commerce of the 
State of Utah as established by UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-1-2 (1998). 
2. At all times material to the allegations contained herein, 
Respondent was licensed by the Division as a Professional Engineer. 
STATEMENT OF ALLEGATIONS 
3. a. On or about October 29, 1999, the Division issued an Order 
in Division Case No. 98-105 (the "Order") suspending Respondent's license. 
That suspension was, however, stayed in favor of a three (3) year term of 
probation with conditions. These terms and conditions included: 
1. Within two months of the effective date of the order, Respondent 
was required to submit a written proposal to the Professional 
Engineers and Professional Land Surveyors Licensing Board (the 
"Board") that identified a peer reviewer available and willing to 
generally review structural or civil engineering services that 
Respondent was subsequently to provide. 
2. The proposal was to provide for random audits of 20% of the work 
performed by Respondent during the previous six (6) months. 
Audit reports were to be provided to the Board every six months to 
reflect the work reviewed and whether the work was performed 
consistent with the standards, which govern professional engineers 
in the state of Utah. 
3. A requirement that Respondent meet with the Board during the next 
regularly scheduled Board meeting conducted after the order 
became effective. He was also ordered to meet with the Board 
every six (6) months thereafter, subject to any modification of the 
frequency of those meetings as subsequently warranted. 
4. Within three months of the effective date of the order, Respondent 
was to successfully complete the Utah Law and Rules Examination 
for professional engineers. Documentation of this to be provided to 
the Division to establish the timely satisfaction of the requirement. 
See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order and Order 
in Division Case No. 98-105, which is attached and incorporated by this 
reference as Exhibit A. 
b. On or about January 18, 2000, Respondent met with the 
Board for his probationary interview. The Board reviewed the order and advised 
Respondent to seek legal counsel if he had questions about the order and 
probation. Respondent was also advised of the requirement to submit a list of 
names and resumes of professional engineers for the board to review for a 
supervisor/auditor within 60 days of the date the Order was signed. A minimum 
of three names and resumes was requested immediately as Respondent was out 
of compliance with the order. The 60-day period required by the order passed on 
or about December 27, 1999. 
c. On or about July 18, 2000, in a probation meeting with the 
Board, the board again notified Respondent that he was out of compliance with 
the Order. The Board requested Respondent to submit by August 1, 2000, a 
complete list of his engineering projects he had engaged in during probation. In 
the absence of an approved reviewer, the Board determined to review the list 
and randomly select projects for its review. The Board again requested 
Respondent to submit by August 1, 2000 a list of a minimum of three names of 
licensed engineers with their resumes for the Board to use in selecting a qualified 
reviewer to monitor Respondent's engineering projects. The Board suggested to 
Respondent that should he obtain employment as a professional engineer, the 
Division might be willing to amend the Order to allow his supervisor to submit 
reports regarding Respondents work in lieu of audit reviews. 
d. On or about September 12, 2000, Respondent submitted the 
requested list of his engineering projects to the Board and requested a revision of 
the Order to allow an employer to be his auditor and reviewer should he obtain 
employment as an engineer. Since Respondent was not employed as a 
professional engineer, the Board declined to advise the Division to issue an 
amendment to the Order. The Board again requested Respondent to come into 
compliance with the Order and submit a minimum of three names and resumes 
for the board to consider at its October 31, 2000 meeting. 
e. On or about October 31, 2000, Respondent met with the 
Board for his probationary interview. Respondent requested the Order be 
revised for an employer to be his supervisor. The Board determined that Board 
members Scott McNeil, Stanley Postma, and Kim Harris would each review one 
file and report to the board. The Board again declined to recommend a 
modification of the Order because Respondent was not employed by a 
professional engineering firm. The Board again requested the names and 
resumes of three engineers for it to consider in designating an auditor and 
reviewer of Respondent's engineering projects. 
f. On or about January 16, 2001, Board members McNeil and 
Postma reported the Board on their reviews of Respondent's engineering design 
documents. They concluded that the design documents provided by Respondent 
were incomplete and could not be used to evaluate his engineering work. 
g. On or about July 17, 2001, Respondent arrived at the Board 
Meeting for a probation interview. Respondent claimed he was ill, so his 
interview was rescheduled to the next meeting. 
h. On November 6, 2001, Respondent met with the Board for 
his probation interview. He submitted his law and rule examination for Board 
review. The Board discussed Respondent's non-compliance with the Order with 
him. The Board told Respondent the law and rule exam was not submitted within 
60 days of the issuance of the Order, as required by the Order. The Board also 
again told Respondent it had not received a written proposal of a peer reviewer, 
as required within 60 days of the issuance of the Order and had not received 
reports from an authorized auditor on the review of 20% if his engineering 
projects. 
j . On or about February 12, 2002, the Division mailed a Letter 
of Notice to Subject advising Respondent of the requirements for complying with 
the terms and condition of the Order. Respondent subsequently confirmed 
receipt of the letter in a telephone conversation with Division Bureau Manager 
Lynn Bernhard. Respondent further told Bernhard he had no questions about the 
letter or requirements outlined in it. 
j . On March 19, 2002, Respondent appeared before the Board 
without the information required by the Order. 
APPLICABLE LAW 
4. The Division may revoke, suspend, restrict, place on probation, 
issue a public or private reprimand, or otherwise act upon the license of any 
licensee who: 
(a) . . . has engaged in unprofessional conduct, as defined by 
statute or rule under this title; 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-1-401 (2)(a) (1998). 
5. "Unprofessional conduct" is defined to include: 
(a) violating . . . any statute, rule or order regulating an 
occupation or profession under this title. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-1-501(2)(a) (1998). 
COUNT 1 
VIOLATING A DIVISION ORDER 
7. Paragraphs 1 through 6 are incorporated by reference as if fully 
stated herein. 
8. The Order in Division Case No. 98-105 provides in relevant part as 
follows: 
Should Respondent fail to comply with the above-stated terms and 
conditions or otherwise violate any statute or rule which governs the 
practice of professional engineers in this state, further proceedings shall 
be conducted and a determination made whether the stay of enforcement 
set forth herein should be vacated and the suspension of Respondent's 
license become effective. 
9. Respondent failed to meet the terms and conditions of the Order in 
Division Case No. 98-105, as described in Paragraph 3. Therefore cause exists 
to impose the suspension stayed in the Order in accordance with the just-stated 
provisions of that Order. 
COUNT II 
UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
10. Paragraphs 1 through 9 are incorporated by reference as if fully 
stated herein. 
11. Respondent failed to comply with a Division Order, as described in 
Paragraph 3. Therefore, Respondent has engaged in "unprofessional conduct" 
as defined UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-1-501 (2)(a) (1998), thus providing a basis to 
impose new sanctions against Respondent's license under UTAH CODE ANN. 
§58-1-401(2)(a)(1998). 
WHEREFORE, the Division requests the following relief: 
1. That Respondent be adjudged and decreed to have engaged in the 
acts alleged herein; 
2. That by engaging in the above acts, Respondent be adjudged and 
decreed to have violated the provisions of the Division of Occupational and 
Professional Licensing Act and the Division's Order in case No. 98-105; 
3. That an Order be issued imposing the sanctions stayed under the 
Order in Division case No. 98-105; and 
4. That additional sanctions be imposed against Respondent's license 
in accordance with UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-1-401 (1998). 
TV.. 
DATED this 'Xci day of *~~j , 2002. 
William Loos 
Assistant Attorney General 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the 3d1* day of M / W 
ss. 
_, 2002, personally appeared before me 
Robert Downard who, after being duly sworn, deposes and says that he has read 
the foregoing Petition and knows the contents thereof, that the same is true to 
the best of his knowledge except as to matters stated on information and belief 
and that, as to those matters, he believes them to be true. 
Robert Downard \ 
Investigator 
Division of Occupational & 
Professional Licensing 
SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED to before me t h i s j ^ a y of /A&^v 2002. 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC/ 




LENORE EPSTEIN (USB 6723) 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (USB 4666) 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Counsel for the Division of Occupational 
and Professional Licensing 
Heber M. Wells Building, 5th Floor 
160 East 300 South - Box 140872 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0872 
Telephone: (801)366-0310 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSE OF 
ANTONE RODNEY THOMPSON TO 
PRACTICE AS A PROFESSIONAL 
ENGINEER IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
STIPULATION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. DOPL-2002-123 
Antone Thompson ("Respondent") and the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing ("Division") stipulate and agree as follows: 
1. Respondent is a Professional Engineer licensed by the Division. 
2. Respondent admits the jurisdiction of the Division over him and over the subject 
matter of this action. 
3. Respondent acknowledges that he enters into this Stipulation knowingly and 
voluntarily, and that other than what is contained in this agreement, no promise or threat has been 
made by the Attorney General, the Division, or any member, officer, agent or representative of 
the Division or the Attorney General to induce him to enter into this agreement. 
4. The Respondent understands that he has th^ight to be represented by counsel in this 
matter audJia»*etaincd Hal Rtii^roLTE^^^ai^. W^y 
5. Respondent understands he is entitled to hearing before the Professional Engineers and 
Professional Land Surveyors Licensing Board ("the Board"), at which time he may present 
evidence on his own behalf, call witnesses, and confront adverse witnesses. Respondent 
acknowledges that by executing this document he waives the right to a hearing and any other 
rights to which he may be entitled in connection with said hearing. 
6. A Notice of Agency Action and Order to Show Cause have been issued in this matter, 
and the Division and the Respondent agree that this Stipulation and Order shall be the full and 
final resolution of all allegations and claims raised in the Order to Show Cause. If the Stipulation 
is adopted by the Director of the Division, no further action shall be taken by the Division based 
upon the allegations and claims raised in the Order to Show Cause. 
7. Respondent acknowledges that this Stipulation and Order, if adopted by the Director 
of the Division, will be classified as a public document. The terms and conditions of the 
Stipulation and Order will be effective thirty days after the date it is signed by the Director. 
8. The Division alleges the following: 
a. On October 29, 1999, the Division entered an Order pursuant to a hearing held 
on September 21, 1999. The Order suspended Respondent's license, but stayed 
the suspension in favor of a three year period of probation under the following 
terms and conditions: 
i. Within two months of the date of the Order, Respondent was required to 
submit a written proposal to the Board identifying a peer reviewer 
available and willing to generally review structural or civil engineering 
services that Respondent would subsequently provide; 
ii. The proposal was to provide for random audits of 20% of the work 
performed by Respondent during the previous six months. Audits were to 
be provided to the Board every six months to reflect the work reviewed 
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and whether the work was performed in a manner consistent with the 
standards governing professional engineers in Utah; 
iii. The Respondent was required to meet with the Board at the next 
regularly scheduled Board meeting after the Order became effective and 
every six months thereafter, subject to any necessary modification that was 
warranted; and 
iv. Within three months of the effective date of the Order, Respondent 
was to successfully complete the Utah Law and Rules Examination for 
Professional Engineers and provide documentation of the timely 
satisfaction pf this requirement. 
b. Respondent failed to comply with the Order in the following respects: 
i. Respondent failed to provide the name of a qualified peer reviewer 
within two months of the effective date of the Order. 
ii. Respondent failed to provide audits by a peer reviewer of any work 
performed by him during the prior six months or at any time during 
probation. 
iii. Respondent completed the Utah Law and Rules Examination for 
Professional Engineers on November 6, 2001, almost two years after it 
was due under the Order. 
9. Respondent claims that the terms of the Board's September 21, 1999 Order were 
unclear or ambiguous to him. 
10. As a full settlement of all issues raised in the Order to Show Cause, Respondent 
agrees that the following Order may be entered in this matter. 
a. Respondent's license to practice as a Professional Engineer shall be suspended 
for a minimum of four months from the effective date of this Order. The 
suspension shall be lifted only upon satisfactory completion of the requirements of 
paragraph lO.c. below and a determination by the Board that his work 
demonstrates an ability to safely practice as a professional engineer. 
Respondent's license shall thereafter continue on probation and shall be subject to 
all terms and conditions of this Stipulation and Order until three years from the 
effective date of this Order unless those terms and conditions are modified by a 
written order of the Division or the Board. 
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b. Respondent shall meet with the Bureau Manager or his designee within 30 
days of the effective date of this Order. Respondent shall meet with the Board at 
its next regularly scheduled meeting thereafter to review the terms and conditions 
of this Stipulation and Order. Thereafter, Respondent shall meet with the Board 
as requested by the Division or the Board. 
c. After four months from the effective date of this Order, Respondent may make 
a written request to the Division that the suspension be lifted. The Division, with 
advice from the Board, shall review his request and determine whether his 
compliance with this Order and the competence of his engineering work warrant 
the lifting of the suspension. Any request to lift the suspenstion shall include the 
following: 
(1) A written list of all engineering projects Respondent has performed 
since October 2, 2002. The project list shall specify the name of the 
project, the type of work, the client or the owner of the project, the start 
and estimated completion date, the names and contact information of the 
building officials, and the fee earned. 
(2) Copies of tax returns or other competent third-party documentation 
allowing the Division to ensure that all engineering projects he has 
undertaken during the period covered by his project list are included on the 
lists. 
(3) The name of a Professional Engineer who has a license which is active 
and in good standing, who does not have a conflict of interest in reviewing 
his work and who is qualified in the area of the reviews to be made. The 
reviewer shall be instructed to provide a copy of all audits of Respondent's 
work to the Division. 
(4) Reviews of twenty percent (20%) of the engineering projects on the 
project list. The projects chosen shall consist of a representative sample of 
the Respondent's areas of engineering practice. Each review shall include 
the following: 
i. A certification that the reviewing engineer has no conflict of 
interest in performing the review, does not have a prior relationship 
with Respondent that raises a potential conflict of interest. 
ii. A summary of the reviewing engineer's qualifications and 
expertise that enable him to review Respondent's work. 
iii. Whether the material submitted for review was sufficiently 
accurate and complete to allow the reviewer to adequately judge 
the quality of Respondent's work. 
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iv. Whether Respondent's work met standards of practice for 
Professional Engineers and complied with statutory and regulatory 
requirements for the profession. 
v. Whether clients and third parties were provided with complete 
and accurate documentation of the Respondent's work. 
vi. How the reviewer chose projects for review, and whether 
Respondent failed to provide sufficient documentation of any 
projects chosen by the reviewer to enable him to evaluate 
Respondent's work on the projects. 
vii. Whether the projects reviewed reflect an ability by the 
Respondent to engage in a variety of engineering practices or only 
a limited area of engineering practice. 
viii. Recommendations by the reviewer regarding whether 
Respondent's work should be subject to increased review or should 
be restricted to certain areas of practice. 
(5) After the suspension of his license has been lifted , Respondent shall 
maintain the project list and keep it current throughout the term of 
probation. 
(6) Beginning four months after the effective date of this Order, 
Respondent shall provide a copy of the updated list to the Division every 
six months. 
(7) After the suspension has been lifted and for the remaining period of 
probation, Respondent shall submit a report to the Division every six (6) 
months. The report shall consist of all of the information listed in 
paragraphs 10c(2), 10c(3), and 10c(4)(i) through 10c(4)(viii). 
11. Respondent acknowledges that it is his responsibility to document competent 
practice and to provide sufficient reviews and documentation of his work to demonstrate 
competent practice. Respondent further acknowledges that this Stipulation and Order 
does not constitute a guarantee or promise that the suspension of his license will be lifted. 
12. Respondent shall promptly notify the Division of any change of home or 
work address or of any change in employment. Should Respondent not engage in the 
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practice of professional engineering for more than sixty (60) days, the Division may elect 
not to apply any such time to the period of probation. 
13. Should Respondent leave the state of Utah to reside or work for more than 
thirty (30) days, he shall promptly notify the Board in writing of his mailing address, and 
shall immediately notify local or state licensing authorities of the provisions of this Order. 
Time spent outside the state of Utah shall not apply to the probationary period. 
14. Respondent shall maintain a current license to practice as a professional 
engineer at all times during the period of probation. 
15. Respondent shall comply with all statutes and regulations governing his 
practice as a Professional Engineer, and shall comply with the standards of practice for 
Professional Engineers in the state of Utah. Failure to comply with any provision of this 
Order or to demonstrate competence to practice as a Professional Engineer may result in 
further disciplinary action. 
16. Respondent acknowledges that knowingly providing false information to the 
Division is a violation of this Order. If after reasonable effort the Division determines 
that compliance with the terms and conditions of the Order are frustrated because of 
missing or incorrect information, Respondent shall supplement or correct information 
within fifteen (15) days after the mailing of a request by the Division. 
17. If Respondent successfully completes the terms and conditions of his 
probation, his probation shall end and all terms and conditions shall be lifted by written 
order of the Division. 
18. This Stipulation and Order, upon approval by the Director of the Division, shall be 
the final compromise and settlement of this matter. Respondent acknowledges that the Director 
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is not required to accept the terms of this Stipulation and Order and that if the Director does not 
do so, this Stipulation and the representations contained therein shall be null and void, except 
that the Division and the Respondent waive any claim of bias or prejudgment Respondent might 
have with regard to the Director by virtue of his having reviewed this Stipulation. This waiver 
shall survive such nullification. 
19. This document constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and supersedes 
and cancels any and all prior negotiations, representations, understandings or agreements 
between the parties regarding the subject of this Stipulation and Order. There are no verbal 
agreements that modify, interpret, construe or affect this Stipulation. 





Dan S. Jones 
Bureau Chief 
DATE .J&c^, / 2 _^J$/Z? 
BY: 
itone Rodney Thompson 
Respondent 
DATE: \ J t ^ / > - -> S3. ,v<?^C j ' "• y 




Assistant Attorney General 
DATE: 
BY: 
•JIal Rcioor .<7<r/" pr&e^J-
Allni'iiny finr£ssrjrjndgit_ 
ORDER 
THE ABOVE STIPULATION, in the matter of Antone Rodney Thompson, is hereby 
approved by the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, and constitutes my 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in this matter. The terms and conditions of the 
Stipulation are incorporated herein and constitute my final Order in this case. 
DATED this I*? day of/^ffr^^*^ , 2005. 
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL AND 
PROFESSrONAlxLICENSING 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the j t> day of January, 2005, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing STIPULATION AND ORDER 
was sent first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
ANTONE RODNEY THOMPSON 
350 S 500 W 




Antone Rodney Thompson 
350 S. 500 W. 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone (435)586-1345 FAX 
Russell C. Skousen, Exec. Dir. Dept. Of Commerce 
Heber Wells Building, 2nd Floor 
160 East 300 South-P.O. Box 146741 
Salt Lake City Ut. 84114-6701 
Ph.(801)530-6702/6446 FAX 
BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSE OF )MOTION FOR A STAY OF Jan. 12, ASTIPULATION, 
ANTONE R. THOMPSON )PENDING JUDICIAIVAGENCY REVIEW 
TO PRACTICE AS A PROFESSIONAL ) Case #:DOPL-2002-123 
ENGINEER DSf THE STATE OF UTAH ) Judge: Masuda Medcalf 
I, Antone Rodney Thompson, come before the court to request a stay of stipulation between 
the Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing and Antone Rodney Thompson dated Jan. 
12,'05(Stipulation) pursuant to Ut Admin. Code §§ R151-46b-12(4)(a) & (b) and as noted in the 
attached Affidavit in support of Judicial/Agency Review. 
I am stating here that my license to practice engineering in the State of Utah is the sole 
livelihood in support of my wife & four children. 
That my family and I will suffer irreparable injury without me being able to practice as an 
engineering in the State of Utah. 
That I have never had any engineering failures, lawsuit and that I have had no unhappy 
clients to my knowledge. 
That the Department of Professional Engineers & Land Surveyors have never shown any 
complaint verifying that my engineering services would place anyone at risk, even though they are 
reported to have told individuals that I'm a bad engineer. If they are saying this to other people I 
would certainly like to see the basis for their complaints. If there is any validity to any claim against 
me I would certainly implement any corrective measures necessary. 
Inasmuch as the DOPL has made statements regarding me as a bad engineer I feel that it is 
my right to stand up for myself and state some highlights of my engineering, which are: 
1. When the prison in Cedar City, Ut. was in construction, I located a beam that was 
improperly designed. The engineering company acknowledged their error and redesigned 
the beam. This saved the State of Utah money & possibly lawsuits. 
2. When the Escalante High School was in construction and the engineering company designed 
a beam that was unavailable, I submitted a composite steel concrete design that saved the 
State of Utah money and was accepted by the engineering company. 
3. When the Brianhead power generator building was being designed I corrected some 
engineering that saved the town of Brianhead money so that they didn't have to buy a new 
generator like the Quitchapaw power generator, that failed and had to be replaced because 
(Motion for a Stay of Jan.12,'05 Stipulation, Pending Judicial/Agency Review) 
1 
RECEIVED 
\'S~; 1 5 2005 
UTAH DEFT. OF 
of improper engineering. The engineering company that designed the Quitchapa power 
generator building accepted my design of the Brianhead power generator over their own 
design which saved the town of Brianhead a new generator. 
4. 1 saved people time and money by implementing innovative designs in post-tensioned 
masonry beams & columns, composite steel & concrete beam designs, pressure grouting 
foundations over conventional pier foundations. One example is a building in Cedar City 
designed by another engineering company, that failed due to soil problems. This buildings 
foundation had large caissons. The building that I designed next to it, used steel columns & 
pressure grouting, which was light and gave good load distribution and has never failed. 
5. There are many other engineering designs that have the interest of the public safety and 
money at heart, if anyone is interested in my success examples I would be happy to share 
them. 
This Motion for a Stay of Jan. 12/05 Stipulation, pending judicial/agency review, dated 
Mar. 18/05 is made timely and in good faith by: 
Antone Rodney Thompson 
(Motion for a Stay of Jan.12/05 Stipulation, Pending Judicial/Agency Review) 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of March, 2005, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Motion for a Stay of Jan. 12,'05 Stipulation, Pending Judicial/Agency Review was sent via FAX or 
hand delivered to the following: 
Lenore Epstein (USB 6723) 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Council for the Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing 
Heber M. Wells Building, 5* Floor 
160 E 300 S-Box 140872 
Salt Lake City, Ut. 84114-0872 
Telephone: (801)366-0310/530-6001 FAX 366-0315 
530 4849/8775263994 
Steve Eklund, Administration Law Judge 
Heber M. Wells Building, 5th Floor -
160 E 300 S-Box 146741 
Salt Lake City, Ut. 84114-0872 
Telephone: (801 )366-0310/530-6001 
Masuda Medcalf, Administrative Law Judge 
Heber M. Wells Building, 2nd Floor 
160E300S 
Salt Lake City, Ut. 84114 
Telephone: (801)530-7663/530-6001 
Governor Huntsman 
Greg Hartley, Assistant 
Telephone:(801)538-1000/1528 FAX 
Russell C. Skousen, Exec. Dir. Dept. Of Commerce 
Heber M. Wells Building, 2th Floor 
160 E 300 S-Box 146741 
Salt Lake City, Ut. 84114-6701 
Telephone: (801)530-6702/6446 FAX 
Antone Rodney Thompson 
(Motion for a Stay of Jan. 12/05 Stipulation, Pending Judicial/Agency Review) 
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ADDENDUM "E" 
BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE REQUEST 
FOR AGENCY REVIEW OF 






Petitioner Antone R. Thompson is a professional engineer licensed by the 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing ("Division"). On October 29, 1999, 
the Division issued an Order suspending Petitioner's license, but staying the suspension 
in favor of a three-year period of probation and compliance with various conditions. On 
June 3, 2002, the Division filed a Petition and Order to Show Cause alleging that 
Petitioner failed to comply with the 1999 Order. After protracted proceedings, a hearing 
was scheduled for January 12, 2005. On the day of the hearing, however, the parties 
arrived at a Stipulation in lieu of the hearing, and an Order was issued that same day 
adopting the Stipulation (jointly referred to at times as "the Stipulation and Order"). 
As part of the Stipulation and Order, Petitioner agreed that effective February 11, 
2005 (30 days from the date of issuance), his license would be suspended for a minimum 
of four months, the suspension would be lifted only upon satisfactory completion of 
various conditions and a determination by the licensing Board that his work demonstrates 
an ability to safely practice as an engineer, and a three-year period of probation would 
follow upon certain terms and conditions. Six days later, Petitioner attempted to rescind 
or set aside the Stipulation and Order, alleging that the Division had breached the 
agreement by prematurely posting the suspension of his license on the Division website. 
After a hearing on Petitioner's motion, the Division issued an order on February 16, 
2005, ruling that Petitioner had not established a sufficient basis to set aside the 
Stipulation and Order (hereafter referred to as the "February Ruling"). 
On March 18, 2005, Petitioner filed a timely request for agency review 
challenging the Division's denial of his motion. Petitioner also requests that the effective 
date of the suspension be stayed and asks for an interim order of stay pending the 
Division's response to the stay request. 
REASONING AND ORDER 
A party seeking agency review "may request that the effective date of the order 
subject to review be stayed pending completion of review." Utah Admin. Code, R151-
46b-12(4)(a). The Division may oppose the request within ten days from the date the 
stay is requested. Utah Admin. Code, R151-46b-12(4)(b). The Department may enter an 
interim order granting a stay pending a decision on the motion for a stay. Id. "In 
determining whether to grant or deny a request for stay, the department shall review the 
division's or committee's findings of fact, conclusions of law and order to determine 
whether granting a stay would, or might reasonably be expected to, pose a significant 
threat to the public health, safety and welfare." Utah Admin. Code, R151-46b-12(4)(c). 
The Department may also issue a conditional stay, imposing conditions or restrictions. 
Id. 
Petitioner argues that the Division's February Ruling is the subject of this agency 
review and that document contains no findings of fact or conclusions of law that indicate 
any threat to the public health, safety and welfare of the public if a stay were granted.1 
However, it is not reasonable to limit the Executive Director's review to the February 
Ruling, which simply addressed a post-judgment motion relating to the Stipulation and 
Order. Moreover, the language in Utah Admin. Code R151-46b-12(4)(c) that the 
"department shall review the division's or committee's findings of fact, conclusions of 
law and order to determine whether granting a stay would, or might reasonably be 
expected to, pose a significant threat to the public health, safety and welfare" requires 
that at a minimum, the Executive Director shall consider the findings of fact, conclusions 
of law and order of the Division. It does not contain any limiting language such as "the 
department shall consider only the Division's findings of fact, conclusions of law..." 
Therefore, for the purposes of determining whether a stay presents any threat to the 
public health, safety and welfare, the rule must be inteipreted to allow the review of other 
relevant documents in this matter. 
The Division's record indicates that the 1999 Order was based upon Petitioner's 
engineering services with respect to certain plans for a warehouse and showroom. In 
1998, Petitioner reviewed a construction contractor's plans for the structure, added some 
generic structural specifications and affixed his seal to a letter indicating that he reviewed 
the plans and approved the structure. However, a permit was not issued, because the 
Cedar City officials determined that the plans were inaccurate and incomplete. 
Subsequent to the disciplinary action, the licensing Board and the Division found that the 
1
 Ironically, Petitioner attempts to limit the Executive Director's review to the provisions of the February 
Ruling but attaches his Affidavit to the memorandum in support of a stay and relies upon the Affidavit and 
the many exhibits to the Affidavit in arguing that he poses no threat. 
specifications failed to meet the applicable building code requirements and that Petitioner 
wrongfully affixed his seal to plans prepared by someone he did not supervise. It was 
thus concluded that Petitioner's conduct was grossly negligent and an extreme departure 
from the standards of practice for professional engineers. Based upon the Division's 
concerns about public safety, the 1999 Order required Petitioner to comply with various 
measures to ensure that he was following appropriate engineering practices. 
The above-noted findings and conclusions of the Division lead to the conclusion 
that a complete stay would not be in the best interests of the public. However, because 
Petitioner's livelihood is at stake, the Executive Director finds that the public could be 
adequately protected with a conditional stay of the Division's Order with appropriate 
measures to monitor his practice. The Executive Director is therefore prepared to issue 
an order conditionally staying the suspension of Petitioner's license upon Petitioner's 
compliance with the following requirements: 
1. Petitioner shall submit in writing to the Executive Director the 
name of an engineer in good standing with the Division who is 
available and willing to act as a peer reviewer to review 
Petitioner's engineering work, who has no conflict of interest with 
this matter, and who is qualified in the type of engineering work 
performed by Petitioner.2 
2. As to the peer reviewer identified in paragraph 1, Petitioner shall 
submit to the Executive Director the following: 
a. The peer reviewer's resume; and 
b. A letter from the peer reviewer stating that he/she has no 
conflict with this matter, that he/she is interested and 
available to conduct reviews of Petitioner's work, and that 
2
 Petitioner alleges in his Affidavit that he has previously submitted to the Division the name of the Kerry 
Carpenter. So that there is no misunderstanding, in order to comply with this Order, Petitioner must submit 
anew the name of an appropriate peer reviewer. All submissions shall be made to the Executive Director 
with service to the Division's counsel as provided in Utah Admin. Code R151-46b-8 and R151-46b-
12(3)(e). 
he/she is qualified in the area of engineering work 
performed by Petitioner; 
3. Petitioner shall submit to the Executive Director a project list 
identifying all engineering projects he has performed within the 
past two years. This list shall include the project name, type of 
work, the client or owner, the start and estimated completion dates, 
the names and contact information of the building officials, and the 
fee earned. 
4. Petitioner shall submit to the peer reviewer a copy of the project 
list identified in paragraph 3 and shall make a written request of 
the peer reviewer to review 20 percent of the engineering work 
performed by Petitioner in the past two years. Petitioner shall pay 
the peer reviewer for any costs associated with such a review. The 
peer reviews shall comply with the requirements and deadline to be 
established by the Division. 
5. Petitioner shall submit to the Executive Director a copy of the 
written request to the peer reviewer identified in paragraph 4. 
Upon receipt of this Order Regarding Stay Request, the Division shall submit a 
document indicating the requirements and deadline it has established for the peer 
reviews. Thereafter, upon Petitioner's successful compliance with the requirements in 
paragraphs 1 through 5 above, the Executive Director will issue an order conditionally 
staying the suspension of Petitioner's license. Such order will include further 
requirements as follows: 
6. Petitioner shall submit to the Executive Director a copy of the peer 
reviews conducted by the peer reviewer as established in paragraph 
4. 
7. Petitioner shall submit an updated project list on a monthly basis, 
on the first Monday which is not a holiday, until the completion of 
this agency review proceeding. 
DATED this of 
Russell C. Skousen, Executive Director 
Department of Commerce 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the _Q_ day of April, 2005, the undersigned mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Order Regarding Stay Request by first class mail and 
facsimile to: 
Kevin M. Sheff, Esq. 
Robert B. Sykes & Associates, P.C. 
311 South State Street, Suite 240 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2320 
Fax: (801)533-8081 
and caused a copy to be hand-delivered to: 
Craig Jackson, Director 
David Stanley, Associate Director 
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INTRODUCTION 
Antone R. Thompson ("Petitioner") brings this request for agency review before 
the Department of Commerce ("Department") seeking review of a decision by the 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing ("Division"), which denied his 
request to rescind a stipulation he executed with Division representatives and the Order 
based upon that Stipulation. 
STATUTES OR RULES PERMITTING OR REQUIRING REVIEW 
Agency review of the Division's decision is conducted pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 63-46b-12, and Utah Administrative Code, R151-46b-12. 
ISSUES REVIEWED 
Whether the Division's denial of Petitioner's request to rescind the Stipulation 
was reasonable, and whether information provided by Petitioner through his affidavits 
should be stricken as not part of the Division record. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner became licensed as a professional engineer in this state on 
February 21,1989. 
2. On October 29,1999, Petitioner's license was suspended, but the suspension 
was stayed in favor of probation for three years provided he complied with certain terms 
and conditions. Such discipline was based upon the Division's conclusions that 
Petitioner engaged in grossly negligent conduct, by affixing his seal to critically deficient 
specifications, which were not prepared by him or under his supervision. According to 
the Division, Petitioner's conduct constituted "an extreme departure from the standards of 
practice governing all professional engineers." 
3. As one condition of probation, Petitioner was required to identify a peer 
reviewer who would randomly audit 20% of his work every six months. Petitioner was 
also required to meet with the Professional Engineers and Professional Land Surveyors 
Licensing Board ("Board") every six months and to complete the Utah Law and Rules 
Examination for professional engineers within three months of the 1999 Order. 
4. On June 3, 2002, an Order to Show Cause ("OSC") was issued by the 
Division, based on allegations that Petitioner had failed to comply with the 1999 Order. 
After lengthy pre-hearing negotiations and discovery, a hearing before the Board was set 
for January 12, 2005. Two days prior to the OSC hearing, on January 10, 2005, 
Petitioner's then attorney submitted a motion to withdraw as counsel and the motion was 
granted. 
5. On the day of the OSC hearing, Petitioner appeared pro se. He engaged in 
discussions with the Division's counsel about the terms of the Stipulation which was to 
resolve all disciplinary actions against him. He and counsel for the Division initialed a 
change to Paragraph 4 of the Stipulation, which deleted the language that Petitioner was 
represented by counsel. The discussions lasted approximately 40 minutes, after which 
the Petitioner and the Division's counsel signed the Stipulation. 
6. The Stipulation provided that Petitioner's license would be suspended for 
a minimum of four months, to become effective 30 days from the date the Division 
entered an order based upon the Stipulation. The Stipulation further provided that 
Petitioner bore the burden of demonstrating to the Division and the Board that he was 
competent to practice in order to have the suspension lifted. Additional relevant excerpts 
from the Stipulation are as follows: 
Paragraph 3. [Petitioner] acknowledges that he enters into this 
Stipulation knowingly and voluntarily, and that other than what is 
contained in this agreement, no promise or threat has been made by the 
Attorney General, the Division, or any member, officer, agent or 
representative of the Division or the Attorney General to induce him to 
enter into this agreement. 
*p *F H* n* 
Paragraph 5. [Petitioner] understands he is entitled to [a] hearing before 
the Professional Engineers and Professional Land Surveyors Licensing 
Board ("the Board"), at which time he may present evidence on his own 
behalf, call witnesses, and confront adverse witnesses. Respondent 
acknowledges that by executing this document he waives the right to a 
hearing and any other rights to which he may be entitled in connection 
with said hearing. 
Paragraph 6. A Notice of Agency Action and Order to Show Cause have 
been issued in this matter, and the Division and the Respondent agree that 
this Stipulation and Order shall be the full and final resolution of all 
allegations and claims raised in the Order to Show Cause. If the 
Stipulation is adopted by the Director of the Division, no further action 
shall be taken by the Division based upon the allegations and claims raised 
in the Order to Show Cause. 
7. The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") briefly discussed the Stipulation 
with the parties prior to adjourning the hearing. A transcript of that discussion provides 
in pertinent part: 
The Court: .. .The Division is represented by Lenore Epstein, Assistant 
Attorney General, Stale of Utah. The Respondent, Antone R. Thompson 
is present. And Mr. Thompson, I believe you are representing yourself; is 
that correct? 
Mr. Thompson: Correqt. 
The Court: The hearing in this case was scheduled to commence on 
January 12, 2005 at 10:00 a.m. before the Professional Engineers and 
Professional Land Surveyors Board. It is approximately 10:23, and over 
the last 30 to 40 minutes, Ms. Epstein and Mr. Thompson have been 
reviewing the terms of a proposed stipulation as to resolve this case by 
agreement between the parties and eliminate the need for a hearing before 
the Board on today's date... 
*** 
Mr. Thompson, I just wanted to confirm one procedural matter with 
relation to all this. It's something you and I discussed briefly when I first 
saw you this morning. Mr. Harold Reiser was representing you in this 
proceeding, and he filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. And I believe 
you were aware of that motion; were you not? 
Mr. Thompson: Correct. 
The Court: .. .Mr. Reiser mentioned yesterday during our discussion that 
there was still the possibility this case could be resolved by agreement 
between yourself and the Division. And as I've just indicated, that's 
exactly what has occurred here in this case. And I believe you have been 
provided a copy of that written stipulation; have you not? 
Mr. Thompson: Yes. 
*** 
The Court: Mr. Thompson, anything else at this point on your behalf? 
Mr. Thompson: No. 
(January 12,2005, Hearing Transcript, pp. 3-6). 
8. By order dated January 16, 2005, the Stipulation was adopted by the 
Division Director. 
9. On January 18,2005, Petitioner filed a document entitled "Rescission of 
Stipulation." The Division filed a motion to strike Petitioner's Rescission of Stipulation 
and the two motions came for an evidentiary hearing before the Division on February 11, 
2005. That hearing is hereafter referred to as the "rescission hearing." 
10. On February 18,2005, the Division issued its Order denying Petitioner's 
request to rescind the Stipulation. That Order included various findings of fact, which are 
hereby adopted as follows: 
Finding No. 4. [Petitioner] appeared for the January 12, 2005 hearing without 
legal counsel. Prior to the scheduled commencement of that hearing, Ms. Epstein 
and [Petitioner] informed the Court that the parties desired to pursue final 
settlement negotiations. The Court granted that request and the parties' review of 
a possible stipulation proceeded for approximately forty (40) minutes. 
Finding No. 5. [Petitioner] ultimately elected to resolve this proceeding by 
agreement and he thus signed the January 12, 2005 Stipulation... 
Finding No. 6. Paragraph 10(a) of the January 12, 2005 Stipulation recites that 
[Petitioner's] license "shall be suspended for a minimum of four months from the 
effective date of this Order." Paragraph 7 of the January 12, 2005 Stipulation 
provides that the January 12, 2005 Stipulation and Order will be "classified as a 
public document" and that the "terms and conditions of the Stipulation and Order 
will be effective thirty (30) days after the date it is signed by the Director." 
*** 
Finding No. 8. ...Ms. Inglesby [the Division's Administrative Assistant] reviewed 
the Stipulation and Order to enter the change in [Petitioner's] license status. 
Finding No. 9. Ms. Inglesby noted that [Petitioner's] license was to be suspended 
for a minimum of four (4) months. However, she did not locate the provision in 
Paragraph 7 of the January 12, 2005 Stipulation that the suspension would not 
become effective until thirty days after the date of the order. There are numerous 
and lengthy recitals in the January 12, 2005 Stipulation and the provision 
suspending [Petitioner's] license is not located in the same paragraph as the one 
which identified when that suspension would become effective. Given those 
circumstances, Ms. Inglesby mistakenly entered [on the Division's website] the 
present status of [Petitioner's] license as being suspended. 
Finding No. 10. Ms. Inglesby made the entry for the Division's website on 
January 13, 2005. The screen with that entry was accessible to the public on 
January 14,2005. [Petitioner] subsequently became aware of that entry when a 
contractor or other working associate informed [Petitioner] of their belief that his 
license was suspended as reflected on the Division's website. 
Finding No. 11. [Petitioner] then filed the "Rescission of Stipulation", which 
included the claim that the Division breached the January 12, 2005 Stipulation 
when the suspension of [Petitioner's] license was prematurely posted on the 
Division's website. Ms. Inglesby corrected the erroneous entry on the website on 
January 18,2005. Accordingly, the screen accessible by the general public on 
January 19,2005 reflected that [Petitioner's] license was on probationary status. 
11. On March 18, 2005, Petitioner filed a request for agency review. He also 
requested a stay of the Stipulation and Order and submitted his "Affidavit in Support of 
Judicial/Agency Review." This first affidavit raises new factual matters including a 1996 
incident involving Petitioner's daughter, Petitioner's speeding ticket of September 1997, 
and Petitioner's discussions with the prosecutor over both incidents. Petitioner 
subsequently submitted two additional affidavits on April 4, 2005, and April 20, 2005. 
These additional affidavits and Petitioner's memorandum in support of his request for 
agency review express Petitioner's concerns about the terms of the 1999 Order and his 
attempts to comply with that Order; they state concerns about lack of due process in the 
proceedings that led to the 1999 Order; and state new reasons why the Stipulation should 
be set aside. Petitioner has requested oral argument. 
12. On April 6, 2005, an Order was issued on Petitioner's request for a stay, 
indicating that a conditional stay order would be entered provided Petitioner first met 
certain requirements designed to monitor his practice. To date, Petitioner has not met 
those stated requirements. 
13. On April 22, 2005, the Division filed a Motion to Strike Petitioner's 
affidavits on the grounds that the affidavits introduce new matters and evidence not made 
part of the record below. 
14. Petitioner filed a reply memorandum in which he also responded to the 
Division's Motion to Strike. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The standards for agency review correspond to those established by the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA"), Utah Code Annotated Section 63-46b-
16(4). Utah Admin. Code Rl51-46b-12(7). 
2. This agency review is from a Division decision denying the Petitioner's 
request to set aside a Stipulation that he executed with the Division and now wishes to 
rescind. The standard of review from such denial is "abuse of discretion." Martinez v. 
Progressive Northwestern Insurance Co., 2005 UT App 297; Richins v. Delbert Chipman 
& Sons, 817 P.2d 382, 387 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). However, before such analysis, it is 
appropriate to address those matters not properly before the Acting Executive Director. 
Hence, the extensive Findings of Fact above and the detailed Section A of these 
Conclusions of Law set forth the long historical background of this matter for the purpose 
of identifying those issues that are not properly raised by Petitioner. 
A. Petitioner's Arguments 
3. In filing his Rescission of Stipulation, Petitioner included seven counts of 
arguments. The first six relate to allegations of misconduct by the Division prior to and 
during the hearing that resulted in the 1999 Order and a claim that the 1999 Order 
contained vague, ambiguous and arbitrary/capricious provisions. The seventh count 
states that the Division's premature posting of Petitioner's license suspension on its web 
site was a breach of the Stipulation and therefore requires the rescission of the 
Stipulation. 
4. At the rescission hearing, Petitioner explained that he raised the first six 
counts in order to establish a trend of misconduct by the Division. He also mentioned 
that he did not have sufficient time to review the Stipulation and that he signed the 
Stipulation because he was told by Division representatives that they would seek the 
revocation of his license. The Petitioner stated as follows: 
Okay. As the Court knows, I didn't have the Stipulation until, like, five, 
ten minutes before the hearing. Dan Jones had informed me in the 
presence of Lenore [Epstein] that he was going to move for a revocation 
of my license, even prior to, you know, to the hearing; that really there 
was no evidence I could provide that would take outside the scope of 
revocation. And I signed that stipulation on the word of Lenore, that the 
Division is solely interested in moving this on and has no intent of injury 
to me. And that is my grounds. 
I rescinded it within three business days, and is based, even though I 
didn't say that in the rescission, was based on Dan Jones's words to me 
that, you know, "Mr. Thompson, you're way beyond. It's revocation." I 
felt that I - you know, he just doesn't like me. There is no chance here. 
And upon Lenore's promise to me that even though the stipulation was 
still vague, ambiguous to me, and apparently to some other people here at 
the DOPL, that I would go ahead and sign it on Lenore's promise to me. 
And I didn't have a whole lot of time to review. 
(February 11, 2005, Hearing Transcript, p. 14). Finally, Petitioner claimed that the 
Division breached the Stipulation by prematurely posting his suspended status. 
5. Upon agency review, Petitioner's initial memorandum and his affidavits 
raise several additional arguments for a rescission of the Stipulation, including the 
following: 
(a) the Division failed to comply with its own hearing procedures by 
not entering into the agreement two days prior to the hearing1; 
(b) that Petitioner was not represented by legal counsel; 
(c) that he was under the influence of pain medication when he signed 
the Stipulation and was not competent to enter into the Stipulation; 
and 
(d) that Petitioner signed the Stipulation under threat, duress, and 
coercion from a Division staff member and the Division's counsel. 
1
 Petitioner refers to the Notice of Notice of Agency Action and Order To Show Cause Hearing, issued by 
the Division on June 30, 2002, which specifically states that "any agreement to resolve this proceeding in 
lieu of a hearing shall be in writing and executed by the parties no later than two (2) days prior to the 
scheduled hearing." This argument by Petitioner is hereafter referred to as the "two-day rule." 
Additional factual matters raised in the affidavits include an incident with Petitioner's 
daughter, his speeding ticket, and his discussions with a prosecutor. They also contain 
arguments that 1999 Order was vague and arbitrary, that he has in fact complied, and that 
he was not given due process in the disciplinary proceedings that led to the 1999 Order. 
Finally, Petitioner cites for the first time on agency review the cases of Bergstrom v. 
Moore, 611 P.2d 1123,1125 (Utah 1984) and Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. Combe, 799 P.2d 
716, 725 Utah App. 1990), for the proposition that the Division's premature posting of 
his suspended status requires the rescission of the Stipulation and Order. 
6. In his reply memorandum, Petitioner raises yet again new arguments that 
the Division has misinterpreted or misapplied the law, the Division has abused its 
discretion, and the Division has acted contrary to its own practices. 
B. New Information and Arguments - Motion to Strike Granted 
7. The Acting Executive Director's review is limited to a review of the Division 
record. Utah Code Ann. Section 63-46b-16(4). See also Utah Admin. Code R151-46b-
12(7). Thus, all new factual information that Petitioner provides in his many affidavits 
and his memoranda on agency review, which was not initially raised before the Division, 
is an improper attempt to supplement the Division's record. Accordingly, the Division's 
Motion to Strike Petitioner's three affidavits is hereby granted. 
8. In addition, legal issues must be raised at the Division level in order to be 
properly preserved for agency review. See Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 
847 (Utah 1998) ("level of consciousness" test applied to administrative agency case, 
requiring a party to raise any issues and allow the hearing officer an opportunity to 
correct any deficiencies); Brinkerhoffv. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 589 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) (holding that a party must raise an objection in an earlier proceeding or waive its 
right to litigate the issue in subsequent proceedings, a principle not limited to the trial 
court setting but equally to administrative hearings). 
9. Petitioner did not properly preserve for agency review the new arguments 
he now raises regarding the two-day rule, not being represented by counsel, being under 
the influence of medications, that the Division coerced him into signing the Stipulation, 
etc. Petitioner stated at the rescission hearing that he signed the Stipulation after Division 
representatives told him that they would seek the revocation of his license, and that he 
believed at that point that "[t]here is no chance here." The above statements do not 
substantiate a claim of coercion; they allege nothing more than the Division's intent to 
seek the revocation of Petitioner's license, and Petitioner's belief that he would not be 
successful at the hearing. Moreover, there was no evidence presented by Petitioner that 
he was in fact coerced by Division representatives. Because Petitioner failed to bring 
these issues to the Division at the time of the rescission hearing, the Division had no 
opportunity to examine whether these arguments supported a rescission or setting aside of 
the Stipulation. Badger, at 847. By his own failure to raise these arguments, Petitioner 
waived them. As a result, such arguments cannot now be considered on agency review. 
Id. See also Richins, 817 P.2d at 387 (Court affirming trial court's dismissal of motion to 
set aside stipulation and declining to consider movant's arguments raised for the first 
time on appeal). 
2
 The Stipulation even states that Petitioner enters into the Stipulation knowingly and voluntarily and that 
no threats or promises were made to induce him to sign the Stipulation. Stipulation, ^ 3. 
C. Denial of Request to Rescind Was Not Abuse of Discretion 
10. What is left then is the Division's consideration of Petitioner's arguments 
stated in his "Rescission of Stipulation" and those he raised at the OSC hearing. A 
request for relief from the Division's Order based upon the Stipulation is properly treated 
as a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure.3 Richins, 817P.2dat 387. The Richins Court stated: 
A trial court has discretion in determining whether a movant has shown 
[Rule 60(b) grounds], and this Court will reverse the trial court's ruling 
only when there has been an abuse of discretion. 
Id. Thus, as was previously stated, in determining whether the Division properly denied 
Petitioner's motion to set aside the Stipulation and Order, the applicable standard is 
"abuse of discretion." Id. A challenge based upon the grounds of abuse of discretion is 
reviewed for "reasonableness." Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 814 
P.2d 581, 587 (Utah 1991). "Furthermore, the scope of review of trial court orders 
denying rule 60(b) relief is limited...the reviewing court will not reach the merits of the 
underlying judgment." Martinez, 2005 UT App 297. Therefore, the Acting Executive 
Director must determine whether the Division acted reasonably in denying Petitioner's 
motion to set aside the Stipulation. 
11. In denying the Petitioner's request to rescind the Stipulation and Order, 
the Division adopted the ALJ's findings and conclusions. The ALJ had concluded that 
3
 That Rule provides that a court may, in the furtherance of justice, relieve a party from a final judgment or 
order for the following reasons: 
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 
(2) newly discovered evidence...; 
(3) fraud...., misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) the judgment is void; 
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged...; or 
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. 
Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 60(b). 
Petitioner's attempts to establish a pattern of misconduct leading to the 1999 Order were 
removed in time, and had no rational connection to the validity of the Stipulation; that 
Petitioner's concerns regarding the terms of the 1999 Order were resolved by the parties 
by the Stipulation; and that Petitioner entered into the Stipulation knowingly and 
voluntarily, after ample opportunity to review the proposed terms. He then heard 
evidence on Petitioner's allegations that the Division breached the Stipulation to 
determine if there was any fraud, misrepresentation or any other misconduct by the 
Division so as to warrant a rescission or setting aside of the Stipulation under Rule 
60(b)(3). The ALJ concluded that the Division's conduct did not constitute such fraud, 
misrepresentation or misconduct, because the website entry was a clerical error and an 
honest mistake that was immediately corrected by the Division upon its discovery. 
12. The Division's and ALJ's conclusions were reasonable in this case. 
Petitioner's attempts to challenge the 1999 Order were properly rejected. Petitioner did 
not file a petition for judicial review of the 1999 Order, and thus gave up his opportunity 
to challenge the findings and conclusions that led to that Order. Petitioner's arguments 
that the terms of the 1999 Order were vague and arbitrary and his claims that he did in 
fact comply with the Order were also properly rejected. Such arguments would have 
been appropriate at the OSC hearing. However, Petitioner chose to avoid the OSC 
hearing and entered into the Stipulation in lieu of that hearing. The only arguments that 
were appropriate at the rescission hearing, therefore, were those provided by Rule 60(b). 
13. Finally, the ALJ considered Petitioner's arguments regarding the 
Division's conduct as to the web site posting under Rule 60(b)(3), "fraud, ... 
misrepresentation, or other misconduct." The Petitioner has not challenged such Rule 
60(b)(3) classification, and such classification was proper under the Richins decision. 
Richins, at p. 387. Based upon the testimony presented at the OSC hearing by Division 
personnel, it was not unreasonable to conclude that the Division employee made a 
clerical error or mistake (failing to notice the 30-day provision within the body of the 
Stipulation and Order), rather than engaging in misrepresentation, fraud or misconduct. 
14. On agency review, Petitioner cites to certain Utah cases that rescinded real 
estate purchase contracts based upon a statutory covenant against encumbrances. 
B'ergstrom v. Moore, 677 P.2d 1123, 1125 (Utah 1984) and Breuer-Harrison, Inc. v. 
Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 725 Utah App. 1990). The Division had no opportunity to rule on 
the applicability of Petitioner's legal authority, because Petitioner failed to notify the ALJ 
at the rescission hearing of his reliance on these cases. Even if he had, however, it is 
unlikely that the ALJ would have found the cases helpful to Petitioner's position. The 
courts in Bergstrom and Breuer-Harrison concluded that the seller's failure to disclose 
certain easements breached the statutory covenant and thereby the sales contract, thus 
requiring rescission of the contracts. In contrast, there is no statute in this case that 
prevents the parties to a professional license disciplinary proceeding from stipulating in 
lieu of a hearing. The case law more applicable to this matter appears to be that 
settlement agreements are generally upheld by the courts. See Ostler v. Buhler, 957 P.2d 
205, 206 (Utah 1998) (holding that "settlements are favored in the law, and should be 
encouraged, because of the obvious benefits accruing not only to the parties, but also to 
the judicial system.") 
15. Similarly, it was not unreasonable to deny Petitioner's request to rescind 
upon the ALJ's findings that Petitioner had sufficient time to review the Stipulation. 
Petitioner had approximately 40 minutes on the day of the OSC hearing to review the 
Stipulation and discuss its terms with the Division's representatives. At the beginning of 
the OSC hearing, the ALJ acknowledged on the record that the parties had reached a 
stipulation after 30 to 40 minutes of discussions; that they had signed the stipulation; that 
Petitioner's counsel had withdrawn; and that prior to his withdrawal, the attorney, had 
informed the ALJ that a stipulation could still be reached in lieu of a hearing. Petitioner 
confirmed that he was aware of his attorney's withdrawal, that he'd received a copy of 
the Stipulation and that he had nothing more to address at that time. Petitioner failed to 
inform the ALJ that he was concerned about any of the provisions in the Stipulation, that 
he did not have sufficient time to review the Stipulation, or that he disagreed with the 
ALJ's representations that they had been engaged in discussions for 30 to 40 minutes. 
16. Moreover, given the history of this matter, it is unlikely that the terms of 
the Stipulation came as a surprise to Petitioner on the day of the OSC hearing. The 
record indicates that from June 24, 2002, until the OSC hearing scheduled for January 12, 
2005, Petitioner had two attorneys. Each of these attorneys had engaged in settlement 
negotiations with the Division. As late as January 10,2005, upon withdrawing as 
Petitioner's counsel, attorney Harold Reiser informed the ALJ that the matter could still 
be settled. 
17. It is important to note that the same ALJ who received the Stipulation and 
questioned the parties on the record prior to canceling the OSC hearing was the ALJ who 
heard Petitioner's arguments at the rescission hearing. The ALJ recalled the 
circumstances leading up to the Stipulation, the discussions held in court, and the 
demeanor of the parties: 
... [A]nd I recall it well, we came here for the hearing before the Board 
and the decision was made that morning to resolve the case by agreement. 
And so there was no evidentiary proceeding conducted before the Board at 
the time because the parties had resolved it by that stipulation. Under 
these circumstances, and the fact that you elected, having reviewed the 
proposed stipulation, to accept it as provided rather than proceed with this 
evidentiary hearing before the Board, it strikes me as a freely-given, 
intelligent, knowing election on your part to resolve the case in that 
manner. And as to that count, I don't see them under those circumstances, 
that it has any bearing on the validity of the stipulation for the reasons I've 
just stated. 
(Rescission Hearing Transcript, p 7 lines 23-25, p. 8, lines 1-16). See also Richins, at pp. 
384-385 (noting that the trial court's independent recollection of the original proceedings, 
combined with the evidence in the record, supported the conclusion that the trial court did 
not clearly err in finding that the stipulation was valid). 
18. In sum, the Acting Executive Director will not consider any new evidence 
or arguments raised by Petitioner for the first time on agency review, as her review is 
limited to evaluating the Division's record and Petitioner failed to properly preserve 
many of his legal arguments for agency review. Petitioner has also failed to prove that 
the Division's decision to deny his request to rescind the Stipulation was an abuse of 
discretion or arbitrary and capricious. Although the clerical error made by the Division is 
regrettable and unfortunate, it was not unreasonable to conclude that this honest mistake 
was not sufficient grounds to rescind the Stipulation. Additionally, given the history of 
this matter, the parties' prior settlement negotiations, and the Petitioner's opportunity to 
review the Stipulation for 40 minutes prior to signing it, it was not unreasonable for the 
Division to conclude that Petitioner had sufficient time to review the Stipulation. It is 
clear that Petitioner wishes he had not entered into the Stipulation, but such remorse is 
not sufficient grounds to set aside an agreement when Petitioner was aware of the 
ramifications of signing the settlement agreement, he was not surprised by any new 
terms, and he did not neglect any point in reaching a settlement. Ostler, at pp. 206-207. 
As the Division points out, parties are generally bound by their stipulations, and it is their 
duty to exercise due diligence and ordinary care, including reviewing a stipulation prior 
to signing it. Yeargin, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm % 20, P.3d 287, 292 (Utah 2001). 
ORDER ON REVIEW 
Because the parties have more than adequately briefed the issues in this case, 
pursuant to her discretion in Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12(4) and Utah Admin. Code, 
Rl 51-46b-12(6), the Acting Executive Director of the Department of Commerce hereby 
denies Petitioner's request for oral argument. 
The Division's decision denying Petitioner's request to rescind the Stipulation and 
Order entered on January 12, 2005, is hereby affirmed. The parties shall hereafter 
conduct themselves in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Stipulation and 
Order. 
.(A 
DATED this *J ~ day of I _4iAfy*> 2 0 0 5 -
Frahcine Giani, Acting Exec^ve Director 
Department of Commerce 
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL 
Judicial Review of this Order may be obtained by filing a Petition for Review 
with the Court of Appeals within 30 days after the issuance of this Order on Review. 
Any Petition for Review must comply with the requirements of Sections 63-46b-14 and 
63-46b-16, Utah Code Annotated. In the alternative, but not required in order to exhaust 
administrative remedies, reconsideration may be requested pursuant to Bourgeons v. 
Department of Commerce, et al.9 981 P.2d 414 (Utah App. 1999) within 20 days after the 
date of this Order on Review pursuant to Section 63-46b-13. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the _^fclay of fijfydr , 2005, the undersigned mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on Review 
by first class mail, properly addressed, postage prepaid, to: 
Antone Rodney Thompson 
350 S 500 W 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
and caused a copy to be hand-delivered to: 
J. Craig Jackson, Director 
David Stanley, Associate Director 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Lenore Epstein, Assistant Attorney General 
Office of the Attorney General 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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